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Runaway Jury: An Analysis of States Laws Concerning Juror Impeachment 
Abstract 
The no impeachment rule bars the admission into evidence of juror testimony regarding jury 
deliberations in proceedings questioning the validity of a verdict.  In Pena-Rodriguez v. 
Colorado (2017), the U.S. Supreme Court created a constitutional exception to the no 
impeachment rule to allow impeachment of a verdict by a juror’s testimony regarding a fellow 
juror’s clear statement during jury deliberations indicating reliance on racial bias as a substantial 
motivating factor for that juror’s vote.  This study traces the history of the no impeachment rule, 
analyzes the Court’s decision in Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado (2017), examines variation in 
exceptions provided by states’ statutory no impeachment rules, and discusses the likely impact of 








Keywords:  no impeachment rule, Sixth Amendment, impartial jury, racial bias, rules of 




STATES LAWS CONCERNING JUROR IMPEACHMENT 
2 
 
Runaway Jury: An Analysis of States Laws Concerning Juror Impeachment 
The no impeachment rule bars the admission into evidence, in proceedings questioning 
the validity of a verdict, of post-verdict juror testimony regarding jury deliberations (Covington, 
2018; Koffler, 2018).1  This long-standing rule is based on public policy considerations of 
preserving the finality of verdicts, promoting uninhibited discussion during jury deliberations, 
and preventing harassment of jurors by the losing party after the trial is over (Casey, 1998; 
Diehm, 1991; Reidy, 2009; Thompson, 1984; West, 2011).  Furthermore, the no impeachment 
rule has long been thought to be vital to the survival of our system of trial by jury, as close 
scrutiny of jurors’ imperfections in carrying out their duties would likely undermine a vast 
number of verdicts and compromise public confidence in the jury system (Tanner v. United 
States, 1987; West, 2011).  Although the rule certainly serves important public policy 
considerations, the rule is not without controversy, as it has prevented courts from hearing post-
verdict juror testimony regarding outrageous acts of jury misconduct such as use of games of 
chance to determine a verdict (Vaise v. Delaval,1785, as cited in Miller, 2009) and jurors’ drug 
and alcohol use during trial (Tanner v. United States,1987; West, 2011).   
While its origins can be traced back to the common law in England, the no impeachment 
rule has been codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) and state statute counterparts (Crump, 
2018; Miller, 2009, 2012; West, 2011).  Such statutes provide for certain statutory exceptions, 
such as the exceptions provided in Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) for juror testimony regarding 
outside influence, use of prejudicial extraneous evidence, and clerical mistake in entry of the 
verdict on the verdict form (Crump, 2018; Miller, 2009).  Generally, most no impeachment 
statutes draw a strong internal versus external distinction, barring jurors from impeaching their 
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verdict with juror testimony regarding matters internal to jury deliberations while allowing jurors 
to impeach a verdict by testifying regarding matters external to jury deliberations (Miller, 2009). 
When the no impeachment rule bars post-verdict juror testimony regarding a fellow 
juror’s remarks during jury deliberations which indicated reliance on racial stereotypes in casting 
a vote of guilt, the no impeachment rule collides with the protection of a fundamental right: the 
Sixth Amendment right to a trial by an impartial jury (Koffler, 2018).  The constitutional right to 
trial by an impartial jury provides essential protection for the liberty of the accused by placing 
the responsibility for judging guilt or innocence in the hands of peers, as a check against the 
power of the government (Crump, 2018).  But this essential protection becomes an illusion when 
the fate of the accused is placed in the hands of a bigoted juror and the courts turn a deaf ear to 
other jurors’ reports that the jury was far from impartial. 
In Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado (2017), the U.S. Supreme Court created a constitutional 
exception to the long-standing no impeachment rule to allow impeachment of a verdict by a 
juror’s post-verdict testimony regarding a fellow juror’s clear statement during jury deliberations 
indicating reliance on racial bias as a substantial motivating factor for that juror’s vote.  The 
Court deemed existing safeguards, such as voir dire and pre-verdict juror testimony, inadequate 
to prevent racial bias, which is essential to preserving the Sixth Amendment right to trial by an 
impartial jury (Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 2017). 
While this recent decision represents a step in the right direction, it raises the question of 
whether legislative bodies ought to re-examine state no impeachment statutes to ensure those 
statutes provide for appropriate exceptions which can facilitate redress for criminal defendants 
whose fate has been decided by jurors who have failed to live up to the noble ideal of the jury 
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trial as a bulwark against the government’s potential abuse of power.  In the wake of Pena-
Rodriguez, it is important for state legislatures to take action since high profile instances of 
verdicts infected by explicit bias undermine public confidence in our jury trial system and any 
extension by the courts of the logic of this constitutional exception to verdicts influenced by 
other forms of odious bias, such as bias based on sexual orientation, religion, national origin, or 
gender, may occur only after a long, uneven process due to the nature of case law development.  
Recent news coverage of Keith Tharpe’s death penalty appeal centering on a juror’s post-trial 
statements opining regarding the “types of black people” and questioning whether “black people 
even have souls” (Claiborne, 2017; Stern, 2018) and Charles Rhines’ death penalty appeal 
raising the issue of jurors’ discussion of sexual orientation as a factor weighing against a life 
sentence during deliberations (Chammah, 2018) illustrate the corrosive effect that verdicts 
informed by jurors’ explicit biases can have on the legitimacy of the jury trial system.  
Furthermore, when verdicts are products of juror misconduct, such as juror inebriation during 
deliberations (Wilson, 2004) or deciding a verdict by coin toss (“Guilty with the Toss of a Coin,” 
2000), and there is no redress for such injustice, this makes a mockery of the right to a fair trial.  
State legislatures can play an important role in protecting this right by taking the opportunity in 
the wake of Pena-Rodriguez to reassess state no impeachment statutes’ exceptions and amend 
them as necessary to promote verdicts consistent with principles of justice. 
In Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado (2017), the Court indicated that there is notable variation 
in state no impeachment statutes.  In light of the Court’s creation of a constitutional exception to 
statutory no impeachment rules, now is an apt occasion to examine state-to-state variation in 
statutory exceptions to the no impeachment rule.  The present study traces the history of the no 
impeachment rule, analyzes the Court’s decision in Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado (2017), 
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examines state variation in exceptions to the no impeachment rule, and discusses the likely 
impact of Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado (2017) as well as policy implications of the current state 
of states’ no impeachment statutes. 
History of the No Impeachment Rule 
The no impeachment rule has origins in the common law of late eighteenth century 
England (Crump, 2018; Miller, 2009; West, 2011).  In Vaise v. Delaval (1785), based on the 
rationale that a witness testifying to his own misdeeds is an intrinsically unreliable witness, Lord 
Mansfield refused to accept a juror’s post-verdict affidavit stating that the jurors decided the case 
by a coin toss (Crump, 2018; Miller, 2009; Thompson, 1984; West, 2011).  Lord Mansfield 
noted, however, that post-verdict testimony regarding such jury misconduct from a source other 
than jurors, such as an onlooker, would be admissible in evidence (Vaise v. Delaval, 1785, as 
cited in Miller, 2009).  This gave rise to the Mansfield rule, which is a blanket prohibition of 
post-verdict juror testimony used to call into question the validity of the verdict (Miller, 2009; 
West, 2011).     
The Mansfield rule enjoyed widespread acceptance in England and was initially followed 
by many courts in the United States, but over time variation among the states developed as some 
states deviated from the Mansfield rule’s blanket prohibition (Miller, 2009).  The Iowa rule, 
established by the Supreme Court of Iowa in Wright v. Illinois & Mississippi Telegraph 
Company (1866), permitted the introduction into evidence of post-verdict juror testimony 
regarding overt acts (such as the use of improper methods to arrive at a verdict – e.g., calculating 
a civil damages award by averaging jurors’ individual assessments of damages or using a game 
of chance to determine a verdict) for the purpose of impeaching a verdict, but did not allow such 
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testimony regarding jurors’ subjective thought processes (Miller, 2009; West, 2011).The Iowa 
rule thus permits verdict impeachment by juror testimony regarding matters which are not part of 
the verdict itself and can be refuted by other jurors (Covington, 2018).  In Massachusetts, the 
jury room door was deemed the crucial dividing line, as juror testimony regarding juror 
statements made outside the jury room were allowed for the purpose of impeaching a verdict, but 
juror testimony regarding juror statements made inside the sacrosanct jury room were prohibited 
(West, 2011; Woodward v. Leavitt, 1871).       
The U.S. Supreme Court first weighed in on the no impeachment rule when, in dicta, the 
Court cautioned against blind adherence to the Mansfield rule, noting that there may be cases 
where prohibiting the admission into evidence of post-verdict juror testimony would violate the 
fundamental principles of justice (United States v. Reid, 1851; Miller, 2009; West, 2011).  Then, 
in Mattox v. United States (1892), the Court held that post-verdict juror testimony regarding 
external influences, such as extraneous prejudicial information and improper outside influence, is 
admissible in evidence to impeach a verdict (Mattox v. United States, 1892; Miller, 2009; West, 
2011).  In McDonald v. Pless (1915), the Court reiterated that some cases may require a court to 
allow verdict impeachment by post-verdict juror testimony in order to avoid violating the 
fundamental principles of justice, but found that a jury’s calculation of a civil damages award by 
averaging each juror’s assessment of damages did not warrant deviation from the general rule 
prohibiting the use of juror testimony to impeach a verdict.  Thus, the Court rejected the Iowa 
rule, embracing instead the Mansfield rule albeit with an exception for external influences and a 
cautionary note that justice may require deviation from the general prohibition in certain cases 
(Covington, 2018; Miller, 2009).    
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In 1975, the no impeachment rule was codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), 
which prohibits use of post-verdict juror testimony to impeach a verdict, with the exception of 
juror testimony regarding outside influence or use of prejudicial extraneous evidence (Crump, 
2018).  Note that Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) does not apply to nonjuror testimony, nor to 
juror testimony if offered either prior to the verdict or for a purpose other than impeaching the 
verdict, even if it is post-verdict testimony (Miller, 2012).  The legislative history of Federal 
Rule of Evidence 606(b) shows that Congress explicitly considered a formulation similar to the 
Iowa rule, which would have allowed, for purposes of verdict impeachment, juror testimony 
regarding objective incidents transpiring during jury deliberations but not subjective mental 
processes, but decided instead to adopt a rule which permits juror testimony as to external 
matters but not as to matters internal to jury deliberations due to concerns regarding the need to 
preserve finality of verdicts and prevent harassment of jurors (Miller, 2009, 2012; West, 2011).  
Most states have evidentiary rules similar to Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), which generally 
prohibit the use of juror testimony to impeach a verdict with the exception of juror testimony 
regarding outside influence or use of prejudicial extraneous evidence (Miller, 2009, 2012).   
In Tanner v. United States (1987), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s ruling 
that post-verdict juror testimony regarding jurors’ use of alcohol and illegal drugs during the trial 
was inadmissible to impeach the verdict in support of a motion for new trial under Federal Rule 
of Evidence 606(b).  The Court reasoned that the substance abuse, regardless of whether it 
occurred outside the jury room, was not an outside influence (Tanner v. United States, 1987).  
The Court noted that Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b)’s external versus internal distinction rests 
not on the location where the incident arose, but rather on whether or not the incident was 
internal to jury deliberations (Tanner v. United States, 1987).  The Court also held that Federal 
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Rule of Evidence 606(b) does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to trial by a competent jury 
because the evidentiary rule furthers important public policy considerations and the Sixth 
Amendment right to trial by a competent jury is protected by other safeguards such as voir dire, 
the ability of jurors to report their fellow jurors’ misconduct before a verdict is rendered, and the 
admissibility of non-jurors’ post-verdict testimony regarding their observations of jurors’ 
behavior (Tanner v. United States,1987). 
To resolve a circuit split, in 2006 Congress amended Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) by 
adding an additional exception allowing juror testimony regarding a jury’s clerical mistake in 
entry of the verdict on the verdict form (Miller, 2009).2  In doing so, Congress rejected the 
approach of creating a broader exception allowing juror testimony regarding the verdict resulting 
from juror misunderstanding of jury instructions or the verdict’s consequences because such 
errors involve subjective mental processes (Miller, 2009, 2012).  Rather, this third exception 
only allows for juror testimony regarding whether the verdict entered on the verdict form 
accurately reflects the verdict rendered by the jury (Miller, 2009, 2012).      
In the wake of Tanner v. United States (1987), courts have generally adhered to the 
Tanner interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b)’s internal versus external distinction, 
generally not allowing jurors to impeach a verdict by testifying regarding matters internal to jury 
deliberations while allowing jurors to impeach a verdict by testifying regarding matters external 
to jury deliberations (Miller, 2009).  In Warger v. Shauers (2014), the U.S. Supreme Court 
addressed the issue of the no impeachment rule’s application to bar post-verdict juror testimony 
regarding a fellow juror’s statements during jury deliberations which indicate that juror’s bias in 
favor of one party to a civil lawsuit based on the juror’s life experiences.  The Court held that 
such bias is not extraneous prejudicial information because the life experiences jurors bring with 
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them into the jury room are considered matters internal to jury deliberations and the fact that the 
juror would not have been seated on the jury had the juror been truthful during voir dire about 
these life experiences does not render the juror’s statements about those life experiences 
extraneous.  The Court further held that Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) does not infringe the 
Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury when applied to bar post-verdict juror 
testimony regarding a fellow juror’s statements during jury deliberation revealing that juror’s 
bias in favor of one party based on life experiences, about which the juror lied during voir dire, 
because, even if voir dire is not an effective safeguard of the right to an impartial jury in such a 
case, the other Tanner safeguards, such as the ability to offer pre-verdict juror testimony 
regarding bias and evidence of bias from non-juror sources, still offer protection of the right to 
an impartial jury.  While the Court did not create a constitutional exception to the no 
impeachment rule in Warger, the Court noted in dicta that its calculus of whether the Tanner 
safeguards are sufficient may differ if presented with a case of extreme juror bias which 
intrinsically violates the right to trial by an impartial jury (Covington, 2018; Warger v. 
Shauers,2014). 
The courts have struggled with the application of the no impeachment rule to juror 
testimony regarding racial bias during jury deliberations, resulting in a circuit split (Covington, 
2018; Koffler, 2018).  Some appellate courts have extended Tanner’s logic to hold that statutory 
no impeachment rules’ prohibition of juror testimony regarding jurors’ racially biased statements 
during jury deliberations when offered for the purpose of impeaching a verdict does not violate 
the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury (Miller, 2009; see, e.g., United States v. 
Benally,10th Cir. 2008).  Other appellate courts, however, have found the Tanner safeguards 
offer insufficient protection in cases involving racial bias in jury deliberations and therefore the 
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no impeachment rule must not be applied inflexibly where it would deny due process or the Sixth 
Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury; instead, trial courts have discretion to admit into 
evidence, for the purpose of impeaching a verdict, juror testimony regarding jurors’ racially 
biased statements during jury deliberations (United States v. Villar, 1st Cir. 2009). 
Despite the important public policy considerations underlying the no impeachment rule, 
many have questioned its compatibility with the constitutional rights of the accused, particularly 
when applied to bar juror testimony regarding jurors’ racial bias (Miller, 2009; Wolin, 2012).  
Scholars have argued for courts to find ways to creatively interpret statutory no impeachment 
rules to allow jurors to testify regarding jurors’ racial bias for the purpose of impeaching a 
verdict (Gold, 1993; Wolin, 2012) and have pointed out that empirical evidence does not support 
the Court’s conclusion in Tanner that other available safeguards sufficiently protect important 
constitutional rights (Helman, 2010; West, 2011).  With the Courts of Appeals reaching differing 
conclusions on the application of the no impeachment rule to juror testimony regarding jurors’ 
racially biased statements during jury deliberations and scholars decrying the injustice which 
arises when courts remain willfully ignorant of racial bias infecting jury deliberations, the time 
was ripe for the U.S. Supreme Court to weigh in on whether the no impeachment rule must yield 
to a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury when a juror’s statements 
during jury deliberations indicate the juror relied on ethnic or racial stereotypes in casting a vote 
of guilty. 
Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado (2017) 
In Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado (2017), the U.S. Supreme Court was confronted with the 
issue of whether there is a constitutionally mandated exception to the no impeachment rule when 
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a juror’s statement reveals racial bias significantly motivated his vote of guilty.  In this criminal 
case, after the trial concluded two jurors told defense counsel that another juror made statements 
indicating that juror’s reliance on a racial stereotype characterizing Hispanic males as aggressive 
towards females as the basis for voting defendant was guilty of harassment and unlawful sexual 
contact and encouraging other jurors to also vote guilty based on this racial stereotype.  
Defendant requested a new trial based on this disclosure of racial bias in jury deliberations, but 
the state trial court refused to grant a new trial due to Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b), which 
prohibits juror testimony regarding statements made during jury deliberations in a proceeding 
concerning the validity of the verdict.  The intermediate state appellate court affirmed the trial 
court’s ruling and the state supreme court also affirmed. 
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, wrote the 
majority opinion.  Citing the United States’ history of racial discrimination in the jury system 
and efforts by both the legislature and the courts to overcome that history and ensure that juries 
act to safeguard the accused from wrongful state action, the Court concluded that racial bias is 
different from the types of misconduct and juror bias considered insufficient to warrant an 
exception to the no impeachment rule in the Court’s precedents.3  While such previously 
considered misconduct and juror bias constituted deviations by a lone jury or juror, our history 
shows that racial bias is not a rare isolated occurrence and must be addressed to promote the 
value of equal protection of the law promised by the Fourteenth Amendment in the wake of the 
Civil War.  Additionally, the Court noted that racial bias is different in light of practical 
considerations which render existing safeguards inadequate in protecting the right to trial by an 
impartial jury such as the risk that specific voir dire questions regarding racial bias may worsen 
any racial bias while being ineffective in revealing such bias and juror reluctance to report fellow 
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jurors’ racially biased statements prior to the verdict.  Finally, racial bias must be treated 
differently than other types of bias due to the necessity of preserving the public confidence in 
jury verdicts which is essential to the Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury.    
The Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires an exception to the no impeachment 
rule when a juror’s statement clearly reveals reliance on racial bias or racial stereotypes as a 
basis for the juror’s vote of guilty.  The Court cautioned that not every casual comment 
exhibiting racial bias warrants a constitutional exception to the no impeachment rule.  However, 
when a juror’s statement evidences racial bias significantly motivated the juror’s vote of guilty, 
the trial court must be allowed to consider evidence of the juror’s statement in order to uphold 
the Sixth Amendment guarantee of the right to trial by an impartial jury.  The Court left open the 
issues of what procedures a trial court should use when a defendant files a motion for new trial 
on the basis of juror testimony regarding a fellow juror’s racial bias and what standard a trial 
court should use when assessing whether evidence of racial bias is sufficient to warrant a new 
trial.   
Justice Alito dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, arguing that 
the Court’s decision will undermine the no impeachment rule’s ability to promote open 
discussions during jury deliberations, protect jurors from harassment by the losing party, and 
preserve the finality of verdicts.  Justice Alito criticized the majority opinion’s declaration that 
racial bias is different than other forms of partiality as having no basis in the text and history of 
the Sixth Amendment and its assessment of the ineffectiveness of the usual safeguards, including 
voir dire and pre-verdict juror reports of fellow jurors’ inappropriate statements, as unconvincing 
and overstepping into an area of legislative purview.  Justice Alito warned that by breaching the 
confidentiality of jury deliberations with this exception to the no impeachment rule, the Court 
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has embarked on a slippery slope since there is no principled way to draw a distinction between 
racial bias and other forms of partiality.  Given the likelihood of further expansions of this 
breach of confidentiality, the creation of this constitutional exception to the no impeachment rule 
may well undermine the right to trial by jury, a right which relies on the ability of laypeople to 
speak and make decisions in the way they do in their daily affairs without being subject to public 
scrutiny.     
Justice Thomas also dissented, arguing that the Court’s holding is not supported by the 
original understanding of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.  The Sixth Amendment right to 
trial by impartial jury merely protects the common law right to trial by jury in existence at the 
time the Sixth Amendment took effect.  Because there was no clearly established common law 
right to impeach a jury verdict with juror testimony regarding juror misconduct at the time of the 
ratifications of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Sixth Amendment cannot serve as a 
basis for disregarding a state’s statutory no impeachment rule.  Justice Thomas stated that the 
issue of whether to modify or eliminate the no impeachment rule is a matter for the states to 
decide through their legislative processes and criticized the Court for overstepping by imposing 
an exception to the no impeachment rule which is not constitutionally required.   
Methods 
In Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado (2017), the Court noted that while all of the states have 
some version of the no impeachment rule and most states follow the federal rule, there is 
substantial variation in the approaches states take with regard to the exceptions to the rule. 
However, there is very little research as to specifically how states vary in regards to exceptions 
to this rule in criminal trials. Furthermore, a vast majority of this research is legal or descriptive 
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in nature and is not an empirical assessment of: whether states offer exceptions to the no 
impeachment rule, under which circumstances exceptions are allowed, how many exceptions do 
states tend to allow in statute, and whether states have amended or updated their respective 
statutes over time.  Also, if no statute exists or there are no statutory exceptions, does state case 
law provide for comparable exceptions to this rule?  The present study seeks to fill these voids in 
the extant research. 
The present study is concerned with two primary research questions: whether state juror 
impeachment statutes vary in regards to the exceptions allowed to the no impeachment rule in 
criminal cases, and whether the existence and number of state statutory exceptions to the no 
impeachment rule varies according to how recently states have amended their respective juror 
impeachment statutes.     
 This study obtained its data via the Westlaw legal search engine. Initial searches focused 
on whether states had statutory provisions for juror impeachment in criminal cases only. For the 
purposes of this study, the United States (Federal Rules of Evidence) was included, and 
hereinafter constitutes a ‘state’ in the analyses and discussion below. This allows for more 
uniformity of comparison as many states have already adopted the language of the federal rule in 
part or in whole. If states did have statutory provision(s) on when juror impeachment was 
allowed, the various reasons were subsequently coded. Based on a review of the literature and 
juror impeachment laws, the overwhelming legal reasons for juror impeachment were whether a 
member of the jury had been influenced by extraneous prejudicial information, improper outside 
influences, or whether a mistake was made on a verdict form. Nonetheless, other legally 
prescribed exceptions to the no impeachment rule were collected as well. Arizona had two such 
laws- one within the rules of evidence (Arizona Rules of Evidence, Rule 606), and one within 
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criminal procedure (16A A.R.S. Rules Crim.Proc., Rule 24.1). The former only applies to civil 
law, and the later uses slightly different language and does not include the same exceptions to the 
no impeachment rule as the former. For the purposes of the study, only the one pertaining to 
criminal cases will be examined, however both are included in Appendix A.  
 If a state did not have a law specifically related to or containing language on juror 
impeachment, the closest comparable statute was located (i.e. juror’s ability to testify, duty of 
jurors, new trials, etc.) and the respective state was coded as not allowing juror impeachment by 
law. If a statute did not allow for exceptions for juror impeachment to occur by law in criminal 
trials, these states were coded as not allowing juror impeachment by law.4  For example, 
Connecticut’s Practice Book 1998 (Sec. 16-34) stated that juror impeachment is allowed, but 
only in civil cases. However, this does not concern criminal cases. Thus, Connecticut was coded 
as having no statutory exceptions to the no impeachment rule.  However, for states not allowing 
some statutory exception to the rule, a review was conducted of Westlaw’s ‘Relevant Additional 
Resources’ and ‘Notes of Decisions’ sections for each respective statute pertaining to juror's 
competency as a witness, or the statute most similar to this. This review allowed for the 
examination of whether a state’s case law, absent established legal exceptions to the no 
impeachment rule, provided for such exceptions.5  All statutes examined and coded are available 
in Appendix A, which records when the statute was enacted or last amended and where 
specifically within established law the statute was found.  Almost all of the statutes examined 
originated within that state’s rules of evidence or criminal procedure.  Also, New York did not 
have a comparable statute to collect, but it was discovered that case law allowed for such an 
exception to occur; so it was coded accordingly. 
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We also examined the differences between states who amended their statutes relating to 
juror impeachment before and after 2010. This range was used because of the states for which 
we have data as to when the statute examined in this study was last amended or enacted (if never 
altered) (n=44), more than half (n=23) were amended or enacted between 2010 and 2018.  We 
used 2010 as a cutoff since more than half of all statutes were enacted or amended during the 
decade of 2010s.  While this pattern is beyond the scope of this study, it could be reasoned that 
since most state’s juror impeachment statutes are modeled on the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
Rule 606, and that rule was last amended in 2011, many states have since updated their 
respective statutes accordingly. 
Nonetheless, this measure includes states that do not allow juror impeachment as well, 
per their respective law or rule.  There were seven total states for which no information could be 
gathered as to when their respective statute or rule was enacted or last amended. Thus, while we 
present basic descriptives of whether or not a state has a statutory exception to the no 
impeachment rule and when it was last enacted or amended (see Table 4), we collapsed the year 
measure so as to avoid low cell counts in our basic analyses.  Overall, of the 44 states for which 
we have data regarding when the relevant statute was last amended or enacted, 32 states have at 
least one statutory exception to the no impeachment rule, whereas eight states had applicable 
statutes, but did not provide statutory exceptions and instead allowed exceptions only in case 
law. Furthermore, four states have no exception to the rule at all – either in statute or in case law. 
The latter two categories were coded as ‘0’ in the proceeding analyses.6 
The first analysis examines whether or not states that amended their respective statutes 
from 2010 to present vary in terms of the number of legally prescribed exceptions (e.g. 
exceptions defined in statute) to the no impeachment rule from those who last amended their law 
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before 2010.  To test if these differences are significant, we employ the Mann-Whitney U test to 
examine whether the number of exceptions varies by whether a state amended or updated their 
respective statute before or after 2010.  Put simply, the test examines whether two groups of data 
are different by ranking the data of each group and then the ranks of each group are compared. 
This test is used for a number of reasons. First, the assumption of normality for an independent t-
test was not met.  Second, the Mann-Whitney U test is a form of nonparametric null hypothesis 
testing that does not require an assumption of normality.  Lastly, this test is the nonparametric 
equivalent to the independent t-test (Brace et al., 2013).  For this test, however, we are only 
examining states that have a statute that expressly defines what exceptions exist to the no 
impeachment rule.  Adding in the remaining states would bias our results as those states would 
inevitably have ‘0’ statutorily defined exceptions to the rule. 
  The second analysis uses a chi-square test to examine whether significant differences 
exist between states with and without statutorily defined exceptions to the aforementioned rule in 
terms of when the state last amended its respective law.  This analysis is important because it 
examines whether states that have recently amended their respective juror impeachment statutes 
are providing exceptions to the no impeachment rule.  Put another way, this is important to 
examine because it signals as to whether states are amending or have recently amended statutes 
to limit or allow the admission of impeachment evidence.  For this, we examine whether or not a 
state has a statutorily prescribed exception(s), whether a state’s case law provides such 
exceptions when none exists in statute, or whether a state does not have such an exception in 
either statute or case law , and whether these realities vary over the two aforementioned time 
periods.  Similar to the previously mentioned analysis, we combine states without any statutorily 
defined exceptions to the rule with states whose only exceptions are rooted in case law (i.e. 
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coded as ‘0’).7  This group constitutes states that do not have a statutorily defined exception to 
the no impeachment rule.  This point will be discussed later, but the collapsing of these 
categories serves to also avoid low cell counts that would result from keeping three groups 
within the dependent variable (e.g. state status on exception to the no impeachment rule).  
 Overall, we anticipate that states that have amended their respective statutes more 
recently will have more exceptions to the no impeachment rule and will also be more likely to 
provide exceptions to the rule in their statute.  
Results 
 Analyses revealed that 37 states provided some form of statutory exception to the no 
impeachment rule, whereas 10 only provided such exceptions via case law.  Furthermore, four 
states overall had no exceptions in either established law or case law (see Table 1).  
 Almost all of the states that did provide a statutory exception to the no impeachment rule 
allowed for extraneous prejudicial information (n=35) or improper outside influences (n=36) to 
serve as legally valid reasons for jurors to impeach the verdict.  In fact, 15 states allowed for a 
mistake on the verdict form to serve as a viable exception to the rule too.  These were the three 
most common exceptions noted during data collection and coding, and serve as the primary 
exceptions to the no impeachment rule across states.  Furthermore, these are the three exceptions 
outlined in the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 606 (see Miller, 2012 for review of these 
exceptions). 
 
    ----Insert Table 1 approx. here---- 




 Other notable exceptions to the no impeachment rule that were statutorily authorized 
included whether: a juror gave false testimony during voir dire that concealed prejudice or bias 
(Minnesota), a juror used drugs or alcohol (Indiana), the verdict occurred by determination of 
chance (Montana, North Dakota, Tennessee), during the trial a juror made one or more 
statements exhibiting overt racial/national origin bias (Virginia), or whether any juror discussed 
matters pertaining to the trial with persons other than fellow jurors (Vermont).  Table 2 includes 
more examples of legal exceptions to the aforementioned rule.  
 
----Insert Table 2 approx. here---- 
 
 Some states either did not have a law pertaining to juror impeachment or did not allow 
any legal exceptions to the rule of no impeachment.  In total, ten states did not have a statutory 
exception to the no impeachment rule, but still provide for juror impeachment via case law, 
whereas four states had neither.  In total, including the Federal Rules of Evidence, 47 of 51 
jurisdictions provide some form of juror impeachment to occur via statutory authority or case 
law.  Table 3 provides a detailed description of the exceptions found in state case law for states 
that did not have a law on the books allowing for juror impeachment. 
 Many of the case law exceptions for states either lacking statutory provisions for juror 
impeachment or having no comparable laws were similar to the legal exceptions described 
above.  For example, many exceptions rooted in case law were related to misconduct by jury 
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members during the trial, the influence of outside influences, extraneous prejudicial information, 
or a juror concealing or demonstrating bias or prejudice.  These were all noted legal exceptions 
to the no impeachment rule too.  
 
----Insert Table 3 approx. here---- 
 Based on when these statutes were last amended or altered (see Appendix A), more than 
half of all states that provide for a statutory exception to the no impeachment rule have amended 
or updated their respective statutes in the 2010s.  The history of seven states statutes were not 
located, however.  Nonetheless, since 2000, 24 of 32 states for which there is available data and 
provide statutory exceptions to the no impeachment rule, have altered or amended their laws 
pertaining to juror impeachment.  Seven of the eight states for which no statutorily authorized 
exception exists, but case law does, were last amended or altered prior to the 1990s.  
Furthermore, of the 15 states that allow for the mistake on the verdict form exception in statute, 
all have amended their statutes in the last eleven years.  No statutes were found to have been last 
amended prior to 1960. Thus, states have been updating their no impeachment statutes quite 
recently.  
 
----Insert Table 4 approx. here---- 
 For example, Arizona, Maryland, and Virginia have all amended their respective statutes 
concerning the competency of a juror as a witness in criminal cases in the past year.  However, 
only Virginia will allow for each of the three aforementioned legal exceptions to the no 
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impeachment rule, as well as for racial/ethnic bias, whereas Arizona allows for six different 
forms of juror misconduct (see Table 2).  Arizona seemingly allows for the two most common 
exceptions –extraneous prejudicial information and improper outside influences- but due to the 
differences in language used within the statute (see Table 2), the interpretation of said exceptions 
may not be identical.  Prior to the amending of the statute, Virginia only recognized extraneous 
prejudicial information and improper outside influences as statutorily recognized exceptions.  
Now, Virginia allows for the three most common forms of exceptions (see Table 1) as well as 
“[w]hether during the trial a juror made one or more statements exhibiting overt racial/national 
origin bias” (Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 2:606).  On the other hand, despite recently updating its rule 
relating to juror impeachment, Maryland remains as one of only three states that has neither an 
established exception to the no impeachment rule in case law or in state statute. Thus, the 
contemporary alterations that have occurred to the no impeachment rule are not uniform. In 
looking at how changes have occurred to statutes concerning a juror’s competency to serve as a 
witness, it is equally important to note the extent to which existing statutes provide exceptions to 
the no impeachment rule.  States that have such statutes encompass between two to six (Arizona) 
legally defined exceptions to the no impeachment rule (see Table 5).  Nonetheless, in comparing 
the results displayed in Tables 4 and 5, it is evident that the majority of states that have the most 
statutorily defined exceptions are those that were more recently amended.  
 
----Insert Table 5 approx. here---- 
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 To discern whether or not states that amended their respective statutes from 2010 to 
present vary in terms of the number of legally prescribed exceptions to the no impeachment rule 
from those who last amended their law before 2010, we employ the Mann-Whitney U test.  The 
test revealed a statistically significant difference between states that amended their statutes 
before or after 2010 in terms of the number of exceptions included in those statutes (U=58.00, 
Z=-2.595, p=.015, two-tailed).  Thus, states that altered their statutes more recently had more 
exceptions (i.e. a higher median of exceptions) as compared to states that last amended their 
statutes prior to 2010.  
----Insert Table 6 approx. here---- 
 
 To test the relationship between states having a statutory exception or not and when the 
statute was last amended, we will utilize the chi-square test.  The analysis demonstrates that the 
relationship between the tendency of states to adopt statutory exceptions and when those statutes 
were last amended was significant χ2(1, N=44) =4.919, p=.027.  This relationship was moderate 
Φ= .334, with the era in which the statute was last amended explaining 11.2% of the variance in 
whether a state provided a statutorily defined exception to the no impeachment rule.  
----Insert Table 7 approx. here---- 
 
Discussion 
This study empirically assesses the variation in states’ statutory exceptions to the no 
impeachment rule in criminal cases.  It also examines whether the existence and number of these 
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statutory exceptions vary according to how recently states’ juror impeachment statutes were 
amended.  States have taken a variety of approaches to carving out exceptions to the no 
impeachment rule.  Exceptions for extraneous prejudicial information and improper outside 
influences predominate in state statutes.  Another fairly common statutory exception allows juror 
impeachment to establish a clerical error in entry of the verdict on the verdict form.  While less 
common, there are other notable statutory exceptions to the no impeachment rule such as states 
which allow exceptions for establishing that a juror lied in voir dire to hide bias, juror substance 
use, chance verdicts, and juror discussion of the case with nonjurors.  State case law has 
established similar notable exceptions to the no impeachment rule in some states for extraneous 
prejudicial information, improper outside influence, juror misconduct, chance verdicts, and juror 
misrepresentations during voir dire.   
There is a relationship between recency of legislative action and the existence and 
number of statutory exceptions to the no impeachment rule.  Our study found significant 
relationships across these two dimensions.  States which have amended their juror impeachment 
statutes more recently were more likely to provide statutory exceptions to the no impeachment 
rule, and such states also have a greater number of statutory exceptions to the no impeachment 
rule, on average.  This does not necessarily indicate, however, that all prior versions of the now 
amended statute had less exceptions on average, as this type of longitudinal analysis is beyond 
the scope of this study. However, it is worth noting that statutes that have been more recently 
updated tend to have more exceptions to the rule on average; thus signifying that recent 
alterations may be further enunciating either what case law has determined and needs to be set 
forth in statute or that the trends are a natural evolution of the no impeachment rule in criminal 
trials. 
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Our examination of variation in states’ statutory exception to the no impeachment rule 
has identified some notable exceptions provided by some states’ statutes which state legislatures 
may want to consider adopting when amending their statutory no impeachment rules.  In states 
which do not have statutory exceptions to the no impeachment rule but do have case law 
authorizing exceptions to the no impeachment rule, state legislatures should consider amending 
existing statutes to include the exceptions currently authorized by case law.  Having each state’s 
exceptions allowing for juror impeachment in a single location, a juror impeachment statute, 
would improve transparency to the populace and thus enhance accountability by providing a 
clear, concise, more readily accessible statement of the no impeachment rule and its exceptions 
in each state. 
Focusing on the number of legally prescribed exceptions is important because states 
ranged from 0 (four states) to 6 (Arizona) in the number of exceptions enumerated in statute, and 
the number of exceptions allowed may reflect the impetus behind recent amendments to prior 
statutes due to various procedural issues state courts have faced over time.  Furthermore, the 
number of exceptions allowed in statute exemplifies how states vary in how they approach the 
issue of juror impeachment in criminal trials; with the more exceptions allowed reflecting a 
state’s willingness to permit the setting aside of the verdict if some issue may have prejudiced or 
negatively impacted the formation of the verdict.  Put simply, the number of exceptions may 
reflect a state’s attitude, albeit indirectly, towards the due process rights of defendants and the 
need for courts to root out substantial bias or juror misconduct in criminal trials. 
Some states provide, either via statute or case law, for an exception to the no 
impeachment rule for juror statements indicating bias based on race, national origin, ethnicity, or 
religion.  In the wake of Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado (2017), regardless of whether a 
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jurisdiction’s statute or case law provides for such an exception, all jurisdictions within the 
United States must allow post-verdict juror testimony regarding a juror’s clear statement during 
deliberations evidencing racial bias as a significant motivator of the juror’s vote of guilty.  Note 
that this constitutional exception also includes bias based on ethnicity, as the Court used the term 
racial bias to encompass bias based on both race and ethnicity (given that the facts of Pena-
Rodriguez actually involved the use of stereotypes based on ethnicity).  This exception to the no 
impeachment rule is constitutionally mandated by the Sixth Amendment guarantee of the right to 
trial by an impartial jury (Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado,2017).   
As state and federal courts implement this new constitutional exception to the no 
impeachment rule, courts will grapple with a number of issues.  Courts will need to establish 
what procedures to use when a defendant files a motion for new trial on the basis of juror 
testimony regarding a fellow juror’s racial bias.  Courts will also need to determine what 
standard a trial court should use when assessing whether evidence of racial bias is sufficient to 
warrant a new trial.  Because Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado (2017) left these issues as open 
questions, there is likely to be substantial variation in the approaches taken by courts in different 
jurisdictions and this may eventually result in a circuit split, which could prompt another U.S. 
Supreme Court decision to resolve these issues in favor of establishing a uniform procedure and 
standard. The findings of this study may provide a baseline through which courts and legal 
scholars can better understand the variance that exists between states regarding the use of the no 
impeachment rule in criminal trials, in their efforts to make a more uniform procedural standard. 
Courts may see an increase in constitutional challenges to state and federal no 
impeachment rules as litigants seek to expand the Pena-Rodriguez exception to allow jurors to 
impeach their verdicts through juror testimony regarding fellow jurors’ other biases.  Justice 
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Alito’s warning regarding the slippery slope will likely prove prophetic, as it seems likely that 
courts may eventually extend the logic of Pena-Rodriguez to create other constitutional 
exceptions to the no impeachment rule for other biases, such as those based on religion, gender, 
and sexual orientation.  As Alito noted, it is difficult to discern how barring juror testimony 
regarding a fellow juror’s clear statement evidencing racial bias as a significant motivator of the 
juror’s vote violates the Sixth Amendment guarantee of the right to trial by an impartial jury, but 
barring juror testimony regarding a fellow juror’s clear statement evidencing bias based on 
religion, gender, or sexual orientation as a significant motivator of the juror’s vote does not. 
However, Alito’s dubious prediction that an expanding constitutional exception to the no 
impeachment rule will undermine the right to trial by jury is unlikely to prove true.  States 
already permit a variety of exceptions to the no impeachment rule and yet the jury trial is still 
alive and well. However, this study has provided insight as to the balance that exists across states 
between the right to due process and the need for jury secrecy; with some states leaning more 
towards one end of this balance than others.  
Finally, we may see state legislatures take action to amend state statutes to codify the 
Pena-Rodriguez exception.  Some state legislatures may also take the initiative to add a broader 
statutory exception to the no impeachment rule for juror statements indicating other odious 
biases, such as those based on religion, national origin, gender, or sexual orientation.  The extent 
to which Pena-Rodriguez motivates state legislatures to amend state juror impeachment statutes 
remains to be seen, of course.  Future research assessing developments in both legislation and 
case law in the years following Pena-Rodriguez may be warranted.   
This study is not without its limitations, however. One is that the data are cross-sectional, 
in that we only examined the most current or updated requisite statute and not lexiconical 
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changes over time. The latter would provide more support for the results of this study, however, 
at the outset of the study, was beyond the scope of our initial research questions.  Another 
limitation is that while statutes provide explicit direction for criminal courts to adhere to, in that 
they are codified and can be more readily drawn on by courts, this study was unable to capture 
all case law exceptions that states have.  For example, it is unclear as to whether these respective 
statutes have evolved as a result of case law, or were created due to shifting jurisprudence. 
Furthermore, do states – that have an applicable no impeachment statute - have the same 
exceptions enumerated in their statutes as well as state case law?  This question was beyond the 
scope of this study as well, but such an analysis could lend credence to the assertion that states 
should codify existing exceptions as they evolve to increase transparency, and reduce confusion 
in the court room.  Lastly, the analytic strategy of this study did not capture other theoretical or 
contextually related factors that may explain: the presence of a statutory exception, the number 
of statutory exceptions, or any such change to the respective statute.  Future studies should build 
on our study to address both the limitations of our study and the areas in which our initial 
research questions can be further examined. 
Conclusion 
We have a long-held tradition of courts refusing to hear jurors’ post-verdict testimony to 
impeach their own verdict, owing to the view that close examination of jurors’ shortcomings 
would only serve to undermine public confidence in the jury system (Tanner v. United States, 
1987; West, 2011).  However, in Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado (2017), the Court decided that 
courts turning a deaf ear to jurors’ reports of their fellow jurors’ reliance on racial bias in casting 
their vote of guilty in a criminal trial is a far greater threat to public trust in our justice system 
than carving out a limited constitutional exception to the no impeachment rule.  This marks an 
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important turning point in our jurisprudence, with the U.S. Supreme Court drawing a line in the 
sand to protect fundamental principles of justice.   
This research can inform criminal justice policy development in the area of state statutory 
no impeachment rule exceptions.  After Pena-Rodriguez, many state legislatures may amend 
state no impeachment statutes to codify the constitutional exception created by the Court.  As 
state legislators undertake this task, this would be a good time to also take stock of what other 
exceptions should be added to states’ no impeachment statutes.  The present study provides base 
line data on the current state of states’ statutory exceptions to the no impeachment rule.  By 
identifying variations in state statutory exceptions, this research highlights the most common 
exceptions as well as notable less common exceptions.  State legislatures can use this data to 
assess whether their state no impeachment statutes have the most common exceptions and this 
may facilitate reflection in states not having the common exceptions on the desirability of adding 
such exceptions.  For example, states which do not have the exception for mistake on the verdict 
form may want to consider adding this exception.   
The notable less common exceptions identified in this study may also give state 
legislators food for thought as they consider whether their state no impeachment statutes strike 
the appropriate balance between the interests in protecting due process and preserving secrecy of 
jury deliberations.  For instance, in states which do not have such exceptions, it would seem 
prudent to consider adding the exceptions for determining verdicts by chance and juror 
intoxication, as it seems hard to justify turning a blind eye to such mischief.  Furthermore, only 
Virginia had a statutory exception for racial bias; as this statute was amended following the Pena 
ruling.  The Court ruled that racial bias constituted a violation of one’s Sixth Amendment rights 
to an impartial jury trial; thus requiring that racial bias serve as an exception to the no 
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impeachment rule.  However, only Virginia has explicitly codified this new exception to the no 
impeachment rule, and it remains to be seen as to whether other states will follow suit.  Since it 
is not clear that ‘racial bias’ could fall under the ‘extraneanous prejudicial information’ category 
(or another category that we examined), states should pursue the codification of this exception so 
as to clarify existing procedure pertaining to juror’s competency to impeach the verdict.  
State legislatures can take further steps to shore up public trust in our system of trial by 
jury by amending state no impeachment statutes to add additional exceptions which allow judges 
to hear jurors’ post-verdict testimony regarding certain overt acts which make a mockery of the 
idea that juries serve an important function as a check against government power.  At a 
minimum, ensuring each state’s no impeachment statute has exceptions for clerical error in entry 
of the verdict on the verdict form, juror alcohol and drug use during trial, chance verdicts, and 
intra-jury violence and bribes would be prudent.  State legislatures can also move us closer to our 
aspired ideal of trial by an impartial jury by adding statutory exceptions for juror bias, whether 
that bias be based on race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or 
gender identity.  While attempting to perfect the jury may be a fool’s errand, we can certainly 
enact policies which move us closer to the noble ideal embodied in the Sixth Amendment. 
In Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado (2017), the Court made a clear statement that racial bias 
is different.  Unlike other imperfections in jury deliberations, the courts can no longer take a 
“hear no evil” approach when a juror offers post-verdict testimony that a fellow juror made 
racially biased statements during jury deliberations which indicate the fellow juror’s reliance on 
racial bias in voting upon the defendant’s fate.  The time is ripe for state legislatures to weigh in 
with amendments to their states’ no impeachment statutes to provide a broader statutory 
exception to the no impeachment rule for juror testimony regarding fellow jurors’ statements 
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during jury deliberations indicating bias against other protected classes motivated a vote to 
convict.  Justice can only be blind when courts are free to listen to evidence of improper bias 
infecting jury deliberations, regardless of whether that evidence comes from a juror after a 
verdict has been rendered. 
 
Endnotes 
1 While the term impeachment is commonly heard in reference to charging a government official 
with misconduct to effect removal from office or undermining the credibility of a witness’s 
testimony, this term is also used in criminal procedure in reference to the use of juror testimony 
to attack the validity of the jury’s verdict.   
2 A circuit split occurs when the different circuit courts of appeals within the federal court system 
decide precedents which establish differing rules of law on a particular issue.  One of the factors 
the U.S. Supreme Court considers when deciding whether to hear an appeal (grant certiorari) is 
the presence of a circuit split on an important issue of law, as resolution of the legal issue by the 
U.S. Supreme Court promotes uniformity of law among jurisdictions.      
3 While Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado (2017) involved a juror’s reliance on ethnic bias and 
stereotypes, the U.S. Supreme Court conflates ethnic and racial bias by using the term racial bias 
throughout the Court’s majority opinion and focusing on the United States’ history of racial 
discrimination.  Given the Court’s treatment of ethnic bias and racial bias as interchangeable 
terms, the Court’s holding logically applies to both racial bias and ethnic bias. 
STATES LAWS CONCERNING JUROR IMPEACHMENT 
31 
 
4 Since the focus of this study is state statutory exceptions to the no impeachment rule, references 
to allowing juror impeachment “by law” refer to statutory exceptions to the no impeachment rule 
(in contrast to exceptions to the no impeachment rule created by case law). 
5 The focus of this article is state statutes governing juror impeachment.  Accordingly, an 
exhaustive survey of state case law on juror impeachment is beyond the scope of this article.  For 
states having no statutory exceptions to the no impeachment rule, a review of Westlaw’s 
‘Relevant Additional Resources’ and ‘Notes of Decisions’ sections for each respective statute 
pertaining to juror's competency as a witness or the statute most similar to this provides 
information on typical exceptions provided by state case law for states without statutory 
exceptions to the no impeachment rule.  See Table 3. 
6 Thus, if a state has a statute dealing with the impeachment of a verdict by a juror, we examined 
whether that statute provided any such exception to the rule. Thirty-two states provided explicit 
exceptions to the no impeachment rule in their statute.  If the applicable statute did not have any 
exceptions, we then turned to Westlaw (see Methods) to determine if case law exceptions 
existed.  This was conducted in a simple ‘yes/no’ fashion, with a basic recording of the more 
readily available case law exceptions, as we did not conduct an extensively deep examination of 
case law as we examined 51 jurisdictions in this study.  If a state did not allow for a case law 
exception either, then they were recorded as having no exception to the rule (i.e. 4 states).  
7 Again the focus of the analysis is on the extent to which these exceptions are provided in state 
statutes. While we recorded a simple ‘yes/no’ response as to whether case law exceptions existed 
in the absence of a statutorily authorized exception (along with some of the categories of 
exceptions we found, if available via a basic overview of state case law), we did not record every 
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exception that existed in state case law as such an examination would be beyond the scope of this 
study and would require a deep analysis of state case law, which was not needed to conduct this 
study.  However, some exceptions were noted, if found during the course of our examination into 
whether a state’s case law provided recourse.  Nonetheless, since these analyses are focused on 
the presence and robustness of state statutory exceptions over the two time periods, recording all 
states without explicit statutory exceptions to the rule as ‘0’ allows for more specific examination 
of exceptions to the rule in statute across states and whether they have been amended recently.  It 
would not make logical sense to include case law exceptions in the same category as statutory 
exceptions in our models since we do not want to conflate the two sources and case law 
exceptions can lead to statutory exceptions.  Thus, when we are examining whether a state has 
updated or amended their respective ‘no impeachment rule’ recently, we are also looking at 
whether they have added an exception in statute.  While this article cannot examine longitudinal 
shifts in state statutes, we can examine whether a state has recently updated their respective 
statute and whether that version contains any exceptions.  We are essentially looking as to 
whether a pattern exists between states that have recently amended their respective statute and 
whether statutory exceptions exist.  For example, Maryland updated their statute in 2018 but did 
not provide any exception to the rule. This demonstrates an unwillingness to recognize any 
exceptions to the rule via statute.   
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Alabama Yes x x  
Alaska Yes x x  
Arizona Yes    
Arkansas Yes x x  
California No*    
Colorado Yes x x x 
Connecticut No    
Delaware Yes x x x 
Florida No*    
Georgia Yes x x x 
Hawaii No    
Idaho Yes x x  
Illinois Yes x x x 
Indiana Yes x x x 
Iowa Yes x x x 
Kansas No*    
Kentucky No*    
Louisiana Yes x x  
Maine Yes x x  
Maryland No    
Massachusetts Yes x x  
Michigan Yes x x x 
Minnesota Yes x x x 
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Mississippi Yes x x  
Missouri No*    
Montana Yes x x  
Nebraska Yes x x  
Nevada No*    
New Hampshire No*    
New Jersey No*    
New Mexico Yes x x x 
New York No*    
North Carolina Yes x x  
North Dakota Yes x x x 
Ohio Yes x x  
Oklahoma Yes x x  
Oregon No*    
Pennsylvania Yes x x  
Rhode Island Yes x x  
South Carolina Yes x x  
South Dakota Yes x x x 
Tennessee Yes x x  
Texas Yes  x  
Utah Yes x x  
Vermont Yes x x x 
Virginia Yes x x x 
Washington No    
West Virginia Yes x x x 
Wisconsin Yes x x  
Wyoming Yes x x  
US Yes x x x 
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Totals  35 36 15 
Statutory Exception 37    
Case Law Exception 10    
No Exception 4       
Note. “Juror Impeachment Allowed” column records whether a state has a statutory exception to 
the no impeachment rule.  States which have no statutory exception, but have established 
exceptions to the no impeachment rule in case law are denoted with an asterisk next to “No” 
(e.g., “No*”). 
*State allows for juror impeachment via established case law, despite having no statutory 
provisions for juror impeachment. 
 
  




Other Statutory Exceptions for Juror Impeachment 
State Other Exceptions 
Arizona Receiving evidence not admitted during the trial or phase of trial; 
Deciding the verdict by lot; Perjuring himself or herself, or 
willfully failing to respond fully to a direct question posed during 
the voir dire examination; Receiving a bribe or pledging his or 
her vote in any other way; Being intoxicated during trial 
proceedings or deliberations; Conversing before the verdict with 
any interested party about the outcome of the case; 
 
Indiana Drug or Alcohol use 
 
Minnesota Threats of violence or violent acts; whether juror gave 
false answers on voir dire that concealed prejudice or bias 
 
Montana Assention to verdict by determination of chance 
 
North Dakota Verdict arrived at by chance 
 
Ohio Concerning any threat, any bribe, any attempted threat or bribe, 
or any improprieties of any officer of the court 
 
Tennessee Verdict arrived at by chance 
 
Texas To rebut a claim that the juror was not qualified to serve 
 
Vermont Whether any juror discussed matters pertaining to the trial with 
persons other than fellow jurors 
 
Virginia Whether during the trial a juror made one or more statements 












Allowed in Lawa 
Juror 
Impeachment 
Allowed by Case 
Law Exceptions 
California No Yes No explanation of what is and is not 
included in terms of juror 
impeachment, but most of the law 
regarding juror impeachment comes 
in the form of case law over time. 
 
Connecticut No No 
 
Florida No Yes Case law allows for exception due to 
overt acts that may have prejudiced 
the jury in reaching their verdict  
 
Hawaii No No 
 
Kansas No Yes Under civil procedure but applies to 
criminal cases per K.S.A. 60-402; 
allows for exception via case law if 
verdict arrived at by chance; 
disregarding jury instructions or 
responsibilities of being a juror 
 
Kentucky No Yes Case law allows for exceptions 
Maryland No No 
 
Missouri No Yes Rooted in case law; Can grant a new 
trial pursuant to V.A.M.S. 547.020 
for jury misconduct or when verdict 
has been decided by means other than 
a fair expression of opinion on the 
part of all the jurors; Overt 
independent acts of misconduct 
outside of courtroom; statements 
STATES LAWS CONCERNING JUROR IMPEACHMENT 
42 
 
reflecting ethnic or religious bias or 
prejudice 
Nevada No Yes Case law allows for testimony about 
an objective fact concerning juror 
misconduct; very vague 
 
New Hampshire No Yes Case law: from the language, it 
appears that the Court's inquiry of the 
jury may elicit testimony concerning 
“any matter or statement occurring 
during the course of the jury's 
deliberations or to the effect of 
anything upon his or any other juror's 
mind or emotions as influencing him 
to assent or to dissent from the 
verdict or indictment or concerning 
his mental processes in connection 
therewith ...” 
 
New Jersey No Yes Case law allows for exception due to 
outside influences 
New York No Yes If mistake occurs; prejudicial conduct 
occurring outside of jury room; 
general misconduct 
 
Oregon No Yes Case law allows for exception due to 
misconduct that amounts to fraud, 
bribery, forcible coercion or any 
other obstruction of justice that 
would subject the offender to a 
criminal prosecution therefore 
 
Washington No No 
 
Note. Includes state case law providing exceptions to the no impeachment rule only for states 
which do not have a juror impeachment statute or do not have statutory exceptions allowing juror 
impeachment to occur.   
a Juror impeachment exceptions provided by statute. 
  












1960 0 2 0 2 
1970 0 1 2 3 
1980 1 1 3 5 
1990 1 3 3 7 
2000 0 0 4 4 
2010 2 1 20 23 
Total 4 8 32 44 
Note. Number of states last amending or enacting the relevant statute in each decade.  Does not 
include seven states for which no data on when the relevant statute was enacted or amended was 
available.   
  




Number of Statutory Exceptions to the Rule by State 
Total States 
0 California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, 
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Washington 
 
2 Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Idaho, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Mississippi, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin, Wyoming 
 
3 Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Montana, New Mexico, 
Ohio, South Dakota, Tennessee, West Virginia, US 
 




Note. Number of statutory exceptions to the no impeachment rule.  States having no statute (e.g., 
New York) or having a statute but no statutory exceptions are included in the “0” row. 
  




Mann Whitney U Test of # of State Statutory Exceptions to the No Impeachment Rule (n=32) 
  Before 2010 2010-Present 
N 12 20 
Median 2 3 
   
Mann-Whitney U 58  
Z -2.595  
p 0.015  
Note. Includes only states having at least one statutory exception to the no impeachment rule.  
Does not include seven states for which no data on when the relevant statute was enacted or 
amended was available. 
  




Chi-Square Test of State Statutory Exceptions to the No Impeachment Rule (n=44) 
   Statute Amended   
  Before 2010 2010-Present χ2 p Total (%) 
Exceptions      
Yes 12 20 4.919 0.027 72.7 
Note. Does not include seven states for which no data on when the relevant statute was enacted 
or amended was available. 
 
  




State Citation Enacted/Amended Chapter/Title Article/Title 
Alabama ARE Rule 606 N/A Witnesses Competency of juror as 
witness 




Competency of juror as 
witness 
Arizona Arizona Rules of 
Evidence, Rule 606 
2012 Witnesses Juror's Competency as 
a Witness 
 
16A A.R.S. Rules 
Crim.Proc., Rule 24.1 
2018 
  
Arkansas A.R.E. Rule 606 N/A Witnesses Competency of juror as 
witness 
California West's Ann.Cal.Evid.Code 
§ 1150 
1967 Evidence Affected 
or Excluded by 
Extrinsic Policies 
Other Evidence 
Affected or Excluded 
by Extrinsic Policies 
Colorado CRE Rule 606 2007 Witnesses Competency of juror as 
witness 
Connecticut C.G.S.A. § 51-245 2012 Courts Jurors 
Delaware D.R.E., Rule 606 2014 Witnesses Competency of juror as 
witness 
Florida West's F.S.A. § 90.607 1995 Evidence Code Competency of certain 
persons as witnesses 
Georgia Ga. Code Ann., § 24-6-606 2013 Witnesses 
Generally 
General Provisions-
Juror as Witness 
Hawaii HRS § 626-1, Rule 606 1984 Witnesses Competency of juror as 
witness 
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State Citation Amended Chapter/Title Article/Title 
Idaho Idaho Rules of Evidence 
(I.R.E.), Rule 606 
1985 Witnesses Competency of juror as 
witness 
Illinois Evid. Rule 606 2011 Witnesses Competency of juror as 
witness 
Indiana Rules of Evid., Rule 606 2014 Witnesses Juror's Competency as 
a Witness 
Iowa I.C.A. Rule 5.606 2017 Witnesses Juror's Competency as 
a Witness 
Kansas K.S.A. 60-441; 444 1963 Extrinsic Policies 
Affecting 
Admissibility 
Evidence to test a 
verdict or indictment 
Kentucky KRE Rule 606 1992 Witnesses Competency of juror as 
witness 
Louisiana LSA-C.E. Art. 606 1989 Witnesses Disqualification of 
juror as witness 
Maine Maine Rules of Evidence, 
Rule 606 
2015 Witnesses Competency of juror as 
witness 
Maryland MD Rules, Rule 5-606 2018 Witnesses Competency of juror as 
witness 
Massachusetts MA Guide to Evidence 
Section 606 
N/A Witnesses Juror's Competency as 
a Witness 
Michigan MI Rules MRE 606 2012 Competency of 
juror as witness 
 
Minnesota 50 M.S.A., Rules of Evid., 
Rule 606 
2016 Witnesses Competency of juror as 
witness 
Mississippi M.R.E. Rule 606 2016 Witnesses Juror's Competency as 
a Witness 
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State Citation Amended Chapter/Title Article/Title 
Missouri Courtroom Handbook On 




Montana Montana Rules of 
Evidence, Rule 606 
1990 Witnesses Competency of juror as 
witness 
Nebraska Neb.Rev.St. § 27-606 1975 Witnesses Competency of juror as 
witness 
Nevada N.R.S. 50.065 1971 Witnesses General Provisions-
Competency: Juror as 
Witness 
New Hampshire New Hampshire Rules of 
Evidence, Rule 606 
2017 Witnesses Juror's Competency as 
a Witness 
New Jersey NJ R. Evid. N.J.R.E. 606 1993 Witnesses Restriction on juror as 
witness 
New Mexico NMRA, Rule 11-606 2012 Witnesses Juror's Competency as 
a Witness 
New York N/A N/A 
  
North Carolina Rules of Evid., G.S. § 8C-
1, Rule 606 
1983 Witnesses Competency of juror as 
witness 
North Dakota Rule 606, N.D.R.Ev. 2014 Witnesses Juror's Competency as 
a Witness 
Ohio Evid. R. Rule 606 2007 Witnesses Competency of juror as 
witness 
Oklahoma 12 Okl.St.Ann. § 2606 2002 Witnesses General Provisions-
Competency of juror as 
witness 
Oregon O.R.S. § 40.335 1981 Witnesses Competency of juror as 
witness 
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State Citation Amended Chapter/Title Article/Title 
Pennsylvania Pa.R.E., Rule 606 2013 Witnesses Juror's Competency as 
a Witness 
Rhode Island Rhode Island Rules of 
Evidence, Rule 606 
N/A Witnesses Competency of juror as 
witness 
South Carolina Rule 606, SCRE 1995 Witnesses Competency of juror as 
witness 
South Dakota SDCL § 19-19-606 2016 Witnesses Juror's Competency as 
a Witness 
Tennessee Rules of Evid., Rule 606 2001 Witnesses Competency of juror as 
witness 
Texas TX Rules of Evidence, 
Rule 606 
2015 Witnesses Juror's Competency as 
a Witness 
Utah Utah Rules of Evidence, 
Rule 606 
2011 Witnesses Juror's Competency as 
a Witness 
Vermont Vermont Rules of 
Evidence, Rule 606 
2011 Witnesses Competency of juror as 
witness 
Virginia Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 2:606 2018 Witness 
Examination 
Competency of juror as 
witness 
Washington Washington Rules of 
Evidence, ER 606 
1992 Witnesses Competency of juror as 
witness 
West Virginia West Virginia Rules of 
Evidence (WVRE), Rule 
606 
2014 Witnesses Juror's Competency as 
a Witness 
Wisconsin W.S.A. 906.06 N/A Evidence-Witnesses Competency of juror as 
witness 
Wyoming Wyoming Rules of 
Evidence, Rule 606 
1978 Witnesses Competency of juror as 
witness 
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State Citation Amended Chapter/Title Article/Title 
US Federal Rules of Evidence 
Rule 606, 28 U.S.C.A. 
2011 Witnesses Juror's Competency as 
a Witness 
 
